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ABSTRACT
The deep recession which hit the world economy towards the end of 2008 in-
duced massive, internationally-coordinated policy responses, both monetary 
and fi scal. In this paper we examine public fi nance developments in Germany 
and Italy in 2009. We fi nd that the larger stimulus measures adopted in 
Germany mostly compensated a more favourable underlying trend; overall, 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balances worsened by a similar extent in the 
two countries. We further estimate the automatic stabilisers to have had an 
impact on the defi cit of similar magnitude in Germany and Italy. We then 
assess, on the basis of counterfactual simulations, to which extent dis-
cretionary measures and automatic stabilizers were able to mitigate the down-
turn in the two countries. Our results show that the public sector contrasted 
the fall in real GDP in 2009 by more than 2 percentage points in Germany and 
by 1 per cent in Italy. The difference in the stabilizing effect of the two public 
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sectors refl ects not only the different size of the stimulus measures, but also the 
higher fi scal multipliers associated with Germany.
Keywords: Discretionary Fiscal Policy; Automatic Stabilizers Germany; Italy.
JEL Classifi cation: E62; H30.
RESUMEN
La profunda depresión que golpeó a la economía mundial hacia finales del 
2008 indujo numerosas  respuestas de política coordinadas a nivel global, 
tanto monetarias como fiscales. En este trabajo examinamos las políticas 
relativas a las finanzas públicas por parte de Alemania e Italia durante el año 
2009. Encontramos que las medidas de estímulo más importantes adoptadas en 
Alemania compensaron, en mayor parte, una tendencia subyacente más 
favorable; en general, los saldos ajustados en función del ciclo primario se 
agravaron en similar magnitud en los dos países. Estimamos además que los 
estabilizadores automáticos han tenido un impacto sobre el déficit de magnitud 
similar tanto en Alemania como en Italia. A continuación, en base a simula-
ciones contra-fácticas, analizamos en qué grado las medidas discrecionales y 
los estabilizadores automáticos fueron capaces de mitigar la crisis en los dos 
países. Los resultados muestran que el sector público contrarrestó la caída del 
PIB real en 2009 en más de 2 puntos porcentuales en Alemania y en un 1 por 
ciento en Italia. La diferencia en el efecto estabilizador de los dos sectores 
públicos refleja no sólo la diferente magnitud de las medidas de estímulo, sino 
también la presencia de un multiplicador fiscal más elevado en Alemania.
Palabras clave: Política Fiscal Discrecional, Estabilizadores Automáticos, 
Alemania, Italia.
Clasificación JEL: E62; H30.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2008, when the worldwide recession began, public fi -
nances in Italy and in Germany were strikingly different. The level of public 
debt was close to 106 per cent of GDP in Italy and as much as 40 per-
centage points lower in Germany. Furthermore, the former country posted 
a defi cit already close to the Maastricht threshold (2.7 per cent of GDP), 
while Germany’s budget was exactly balanced.1 The main public fi nance 
aggregates showed relatively minor differences, with the revenue ratio and 
1. The difference in the overall balance was due to higher interest payments in Italy, while the
level of the primary balance was roughly the same in the two countries.
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the primary expenditure ratio in Italy being higher by almost 2 percentage 
points. Section 2 below examines to what extent the differences in fi scal 
positions in 2008 depended on the policies implemented by Germany and 
Italy since 1997 – the year relevant for qualifi cation to participate in the 
Monetary Union.
Given their fi scal conditions in 2008, it is not surprising that the size 
of the discretionary measures adopted by the two countries facing the loom-
ing recession were at the extremes of the range spanned by the reactions 
of all European governments.2 The gap in the debt levels took particular 
relevance in the context of the widening of the spreads between government 
bonds in the last months of 2008, which warned that sizeable expansionary 
fi scal action in Italy would result in higher fi nancing costs. For Germany, on 
the contrary, additional public borrowing was not perceived to increase the 
pressure on interest rates.
The timing, magnitude and composition of the stimulus actions 
adopted in Germany and Italy for 2009 and 2010 are examined in Section 3. 
The comparative analysis for 2009 shows, inter alia, that the larger defi cit-
increasing impact of the measures adopted in Germany mostly compensated 
a more favourable underlying development in the balance in that country. 
Compared to Germany, the Italian fi scal actions intervened more on the 
composition of the budget in order to stimulate the economy, while limit-
ing the short-term effects on the defi cit. The budgetary impact of automatic 
stabilizers is found to be largely similar. Going forward, the picture for 2010 
seems more clear cut. While the defi cit ratio in Italy is expected to improve 
marginally, for Germany it is projected to rise by ¾ percentage points, re-
fl ecting further sizeable stimulus measures which are only to a limited ex-
tend offset by a positive impact from the cycle.
In Section 4 the effects of the stimulus measures and the automatic 
stabilizers on the Italian and German economies in 2009 are assessed on the 
basis of counterfactual simulations of the econometric models used, respec-
tively, in the Bank of Italy and in the Deutsche Bundesbank. We fi nd that, 
overall, general government developments limited the fall in real GDP in 
2009 by more than 2 percentage points in Germany and by 1 point in Italy. 
This gap refl ects both the different size of the stimulus measures in the two 
countries and the higher fi scal multipliers estimated for Germany.
Section 5 concludes.
2. European Commission (2009), Table I.1.1, p. 14.
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II. FISCAL POLICIES BEFORE THE CRISIS: FROM 1998 TO 2008
Between 1997 and 2008, the general government defi cit in Germany 
and Italy followed separate paths: while it turned from a defi cit of 2.6 per 
cent of GDP into a marginal surplus in the former country, it remained stable 
in the latter, at 2.7 per cent of GDP. In the same period, the Italian public 
debt declined by 11.7 percentage points, to 106.3 per cent of GDP, while that 
of Germany rose by 6.6 percentage points, to 66.3 per cent (Figure 1).
In this period, German and Italian fi scal policies did not fully comply 
with the European fi scal criteria. The net borrowing in both countries exceed-
ed for four years in a row the 3 per cent of GDP limit set by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The excessive defi cits occurred at 
the beginning of the decade, in the context of a recession which can be deemed 
at most mild – particularly from today’s standpoint. As for the limit indicated 
in the Treaty for public debts (60 per cent of GDP), after 2002 Germany’s debt 
consistently exceeded the threshold, with a clear upward trend. In the case of 
Italy, given the very high starting condition, the modest reduction in the debt 
ratio did not meet the Treaty provision that it be “suffi ciently diminishing and 
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace”. Moreover, approxi-
mately two thirds of the reduction were due to extraordinary operations (debt 
restructuring and sale of assets) which left the public sector net wealth un-
changed (Momigliano and Rizza, 2007). Finally, precisely in view of its high 
debt level, Italy had vowed (at the ECOFIN Council held in York in March 
1998; Corriere della Sera, 1998) to achieve a rapid convergence towards the 
Treaty benchmark debt level, by maintaining a primary surplus equal or above 
5 per cent of GDP. Had this commitment been met, ceteris paribus, in 2008 
the debt level would have been close to 80 per cent of GDP.
Developments in primary balances are reported in Figure 2 (left pan-
el; data adjusted for cyclical effects3,4 and temporary government measures 
are shown in the right panel).
Excluding interest payments from the balance (see Figure 2, left) does 
not affect the analysis for Germany, as this budgetary item remains largely 
3. Data were adjusted using the methodology developed within the European System of Central
Banks (see Bouthevillain et al., 2001; Kremer et al., 2006a, and, for applications of the method in 
Germany and Italy, Kremer and Wendorff, 2004; Kremer et al., 2006b; and Marino et al., 2008a and 
2008b).
4. These effects are usually the most important transitory factors, but we are still far from
capturing the infl uence of all temporary factors on public fi nances. Other temporary factors with an 
impact on revenue include fl uctuations in interest rates and in prices of real estate, stocks and oil.
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unchanged in the period. For Italy, instead, the examination of the primary 
balance unveils a rapid and almost continuous deterioration between 1997 
– when it stood at 6.6 per cent of GDP – and 2005, when it was virtually
nil.5 After 1997, Italian public fi nances progressively benefi ted from the 
fall in rates which occurred after joining the Monetary Union. However, 
interest payments savings did not result in an improvement in the balance; 
rather, they were largely used to reverse the increases in revenue and cuts 
in health and capital expenditure which had taken place in the fi scal ad-
justment of the years 1992-97 (Degni et al., 2001; Balassone et al., 2002, 
Marino et al., 2008a).
Figure 1
General Government Net Borrowing and Public Debt 
(percent of GDP)
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Note: The balances and the dynamics of the debt in 2000 were infl uenced by the extraordinary 
proceeds from the sale of UMTS licences (2.4 and 1.2 per cent of GDP, respectively, in 
Germany and Italy).
5. In this paper we consider the budget balance defi nition which is relevant for the excessive
defi cit procedure, i.e. the general government balance including the effects of swaps and forward 
rate agreements. Furthermore, for an homogeneous comparison, the general government revenue 
and expenditure are defi ned according to the criterion adopted by the EU (Regulation EC/1500/2000, 
relevant for the updates of the stability programme), which differs from the “traditional criterion” 
used in the national accounts published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
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Figure 2
General Government Primary Surplus 
(unadjusted and structural)
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The path of the structural primary balance (i.e. adjusted for the effects 
of the cycle and temporary measures) in the two countries broadly confi rms 
the analysis above. However, a few remarkable differences are apparent. 
First, the worsening trend in Italy ends two years earlier than shown by the 
unadjusted primary balance, approximately in 2003, when the gap in the 
structural primary balance between the two countries also closes. Second, 
Italy and Germany appear to have followed largely similar fi scal policies 
in the following years, as their structural primary balances move closely 
together. As will be seen when we turn to 2009, the fi scal stance of the two 
countries remained similar last year too.
In Figure 3 we show the development of revenue and primary expendi-
ture in the two countries, adjusted for the effects of the economic cycle and 
temporary government measures. We fi nd a striking difference between the two 
countries in the dynamics of the structural primary expenditures (as a ratio to 
trend GDP): in 1997 this aggregate was 3.5 percentage points higher in Germany 
than in Italy, while 11 years later it was lower by over 1.5 percentage points. This 
reversal is due for ¾ to the increase in the Italian expenditure ratio and for ¼ 
to the decline in that of Germany. Large differences can be found for social ex-
penditures (which increased by 2 percentage points of trend GDP in Italy, while 
they declined by 0.3 in Germany) and public wages and salaries (which in Italy 
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increased by 0.2 percentage points while in Germany they declined by 1 pp).6 
In Marino et al. (2008b), the increase in structural Italian expenditures between 
1997 and 2007 is largely attributed to the strong dynamics of health and capital 
expenditures. In Germany, the decline in the ratio between social payments and 
trend GDP started in 2003, following comprehensive reforms of the welfare sys-
tem. The dynamics of German public wages and salaries remained subdued over 
the whole period, refl ecting the decline in the number of government employees 
and the moderation in wage agreements (with the agreements being system-
atically lower than in the private sector). As for the structural revenue ratio, it 
dropped by approximately 2 percentage points in both countries, with the Italian 
ratio remaining higher than the German one by about 1 percentage point. For 
both countries the increase in 2006-07 is driven by unexpected revenue wind-
falls, largely concentrated in profi t-related taxes, and legislative measures.
Summing up, public sector developments in Germany and Italy be-
tween 1998 and 2008 show both similarities and differences.
First, both countries clearly failed to fully comply with the European 
fiscal criteria, for both deficit and debt. However, in the later years overall and 
primary balances improved more in Germany, reflecting to a large extent the 
higher growth of 2007-08 (Figure 4)7,8. As a consequence, in 2008 Germany was in 
a far better position to cope with the recession. Nevertheless, even the German fiscal 
margin at end-2008 was not fully adequate, given the depth of the 2009 recession.
Second, in terms of primary balance and expenditure – two key indi-
cators for assessing the soundness of public fi nance – the performance of the 
two countries was strikingly different. While Italy completely dissipated the 
Maastricht dividend of lower interest rates on higher primary expenditures 
(and, to a lesser extent, lower revenues), Germany achieved a substantial 
reduction in primary expenditure, which resulted in an improvement of the 
primary balance in spite of falling revenues.9
6. In nominal terms, in the period 1998-2008 the average growth of unadjusted primary
expenditure in Italy is 4.8 per cent, against 1.7 per cent in Germany. The gap shrinks only marginally 
in the last years: in the period 2004-08 the average growth declines in both countries to, respectively, 
3.5 per cent and 0.8 per cent.
7. Between 1997 and 2006 the cumulated growth of the two countries is almost identical, while in 
the following two years in Italy it is a mere 0.2 per cent, while in Germany it amounts to 3.8 per cent.
8. The different fi scal position of the two countries in 2008 was also infl uenced by the German
better structural performance in 2005.
9. The decline of the revenue ratio seems to have been largely caused by a negative decoupling 
of growth of important macroeconomic assessment bases from GDP growth whereas legislative 
changes are positive and a substantial fi scal drag has accumulated in the period.
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The structural deterioration of Italian primary balance essentially oc-
curred in the years 1998-2003. In the following 5 years the levels of the 
structural primary balances in the two countries moved together, indicating 
that Italy and Germany adopted broadly similar policies.
Figure 3
Structural Revenue and Primary Expenditure 
(percent of trend GDP)
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III. THE FISCAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
The fi rst clear fi scal reaction to the crisis took place in November 
2008 in both Italy and Germany, after the sudden, dramatic escalation of the 
fi nancial market turmoil, with both countries issuing an emergency stimulus 
package.10 In the previous months, a number of fi scal measures had been 
adopted which were unrelated to the looming crisis. In August, Italy had 
approved a defi cit-reducing three-year budget, with an impact on net bor-
rowing estimated at 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2009 (1.0 per cent in 2010).11 In 
October, Germany had introduced a number of measures with a combined 
defi cit-increasing effect amounting to 0.3 per cent of GDP for 2009 (0.6 per 
cent in 2010).12 As shown in Figure 5, when these decisions were taken, 
GDP growth projections, though not particularly favourable, were still posi-
tive for both countries.
The measures taken by Germany and Italy before November went 
into the direction of aligning the fi scal stance for 2009 in the two countries, 
offsetting the divergent trend of their budget balances which would have 
occurred in a no-policy-change scenario. Early in November, the European 
Commission’s assessment of macroeconomic and budgetary developments 
for 2009 was almost identical for the two countries: in both Germany and 
Italy real GDP was expected to stagnate and the defi cit was envisaged to 
worsen by 0.2 percentage points of output (European Commission, 2008). 
Ex post data for 2009 seem to show that the pre-November policies were 
not able to fully close the divergent trend of the budget balances in the two 
countries, as explained further on.
10. Prior to that, both governments (and particularly the German one) had taken action, together with
monetary policy authorities, to contribute to avert the collapse of their respective fi nancial systems.
11. The three-year budget was basically confi rmed in the Finance Bill for 2009, presented to the 
Parliament at the end of September.
12. Indeed, the enlarged deductability of insurance contributions as of 2010, which of all these
measures has the largest defi cit impact, followed from an earlier ruling of the constitutional court.
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The Italian stimulus package introduced in November included trans-
fers to low-income households and, on a smaller scale, relief measures for 
enterprises. According to government estimates, those measures were fully 
fi nanced by revenue increases, mainly by means of the introduction of a vol-
untary substitute tax on asset re-evaluations and, to a lesser extent, by means 
of expenditure cuts.13 The German stimulus package, by contrast, was esti-
mated to increase the defi cit by 0.2 per cent of GDP in 2009 and 0.3 per cent 
in 2010.14 It consisted mainly of additional public investment, a temporary 
reintroduction of declining-balance depreciation for machinery and equip-
ment, and an extension of tax deductions allowed for handicraft services.
In December 2008 the European Council called on member states 
to coordinate the fi scal response to the crisis by implementing a European 
Economic Recovery Plan which recommended a budgetary stimulus of 1.5 
per cent of GDP cumulatively for 2009 and 2010 (1.2 per cent of GDP by 
member states and 0.3 per cent at the EU level). The stimulus was required 
to be TTT (temporary, timely and targeted). Moreover, countries with more 
fi scal room for manoeuvre were asked to provide a larger fi scal stimulus 
than countries with a less favourable starting position. The decision of the 
European Council called on Germany – until then reluctant to expand its 
budget – to do more to sustain the economy, while giving political support 
to the prudent attitude adopted by the Italian Government.
Around the turn of the year it became increasingly clear that not only 
countries with bubbles in the housing markets and low competitiveness would 
be severely affected by the global downturn, but also – or even especially – open 
economies with a large share of investment and durable consumption products 
in their exports. The latter description fi ts perfectly Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy as well; the strong economic ties between the two countries made it 
also likely that their destinies in the upcoming recession be closely linked.
The rapid deterioration of macroeconomic prospects (Figure 5) induced 
both countries to implement a second stimulus package shortly after the fi rst. 
This time Germany reacted fi rst, in January 2009, and with a far larger inter-
vention, whose estimated impact on the 2009 defi cit amounted to 0.7 per cent 
of GDP (1.1 per cent in 2010). The main measure was an increase in public 
infrastructure investments; the package also included income tax reductions and 
13. As the revenue from the substitute tax was higher than expected, overall the package is
likely to have reduced the defi cit ex post.
14. The fi gures on the fi scal impact of the various measures refl ect government estimates and
our own assessment.
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a reduction of the contribution rate to the statutory health insurance. Various 
measures to dampen the labour market effects of the crisis were put in place, 
most importantly additional support for short-time work. Transfer payments to 
households were increased, mainly through a one-off child bonus to be paid in 
the Spring. The provisions included a temporary car scrapping premium paid to 
households (extended in April). The second Italian fi scal package was passed in 
February 2009; it too included a similar car scrapping incentive, fi nanced partly 
by closing some tax loopholes and partly by the higher tax revenue expected 
from the increase in car purchases induced by the measure.
The synchronization of the fi scal reaction in the two countries ends 
with the second stimulus package. In June, amid signs of a worldwide easing 
of the recession but in the presence of a steady and worrisome deterioration 
of the labour market, the Italian government approved an additional anti-cri-
sis decree – designed once again to be neutral on the budget balance – which 
included provisions aimed at strengthening the social safety net and, most 
notably, introducing large tax incentives for purchases of machinery in the 
following 12 months. Furthermore, the mid-year budget revision in July in-
cluded temporary boosts to intermediate consumption and public investment. 
These measures entailed a 0.3 percentage points of GDP impact on the public 
balance for 2009; this being the only defi cit-increasing package to be approved 
throughout the crisis. The budget for 2010, passed by the Parliament at the end 
of December 2009,15 once again included expenditure increases (amounting 
to 0.2 per cent of GDP), fi nanced by an extraordinary tax (the so-called “tax 
shield”),16 with an estimated zero effect on the balance.
As for Germany, only in December of 2009 did the newly-elected 
government pass an additional fi scal package with the objective of providing 
a further stimulus and fostering long-run growth.17 The measures included 
a further increase in child benefi ts, reductions of enterprise and inheritance 
taxes and a lower VAT rate for accommodation services, which accompa-
nied a temporary grant to the health fund. In total, the impact of the package 
on the budget balance in 2010 was estimated at 0.4 per cent of GDP.
15. The budget was partly anticipated, as in 2008, by a decree (No. 112) in the Summer.
16. The revenue which in October 2009 was expected to be raised in December from the foreign 
assets disclosure scheme (0.25 per cent of GDP) was shifted from 2009 to 2010 by reducing the size 
of the advance personal income tax payment due at the end of 2009. Ex post the revenue from the 
scheme was slightly higher than expected (less than an additional 0.1 per cent of GDP) and the ad-
ditional receipts improved the balance in 2009. 
17. Minor relief measures for enterprises were adopted in July 2009, with an effect on the defi cit
in 2009 lower than 0.1 per cent of GDP. 
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Summing up, if we include all actions taken since the summer of 
2008, in Italy discretionary measures improved the budget balance by 0.3 
per cent of GDP in 2009 and by approximately 1.0 in 2010 (refl ecting the re-
strictive measures taken before the crisis exploded, only partly offset by def-
icit-increasing measures issued in late 2009), while in Germany fi scal poli-
cies worsened the balance by respectively 1.3 and 2.5 per cent of GDP.18
In our analysis we focus on the crisis-motivated discretionary meas-
ures taken since November 2008.19,20 In our assessment these measures have 
led to a fi scal loosening far greater in Germany (with an impact on the defi cit 
amounting to 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2009 and about 2 per cent in 2010) than 
in Italy (0.3 and basically zero, respectively, for the two years).21, 22 While of-
fi cial fi gures for 2009 are available, for 2010 they obviously are not. Our esti-
mates for this year should thus be treated with particular caution; this is one of 
the reasons why most of our empirical results in Section 4 focus on 2009.
Obvious reasons led Italy to a more prudent behaviour, among which 
the worse starting position for both defi cit and debt. The different ex ante 
orientation of fi scal policy may also refl ect differing real-time expectations 
concerning the size of the downturn. As shown in Figure 5, in the fi rst months 
of 2009 the worsening of the outlook was more pronounced in Germany than 
in Italy. Finally, budgetary rules in Italy do not allow for defi cit-increasing 
packages except in the case of the Finance Bill. Therefore, after the budget for 
18. Measures that do not have an (immediate) impact on the general government defi cit like guar-
antees or off-budget measures (especially in the context of support for the fi nancial sector) are not 
included in this analysis although they might have a signifi cant impact on macroeconomic variables.
19. The reintroduction of the commuters allowance in Germany (which followed a ruling by the 
Constitutional Court in December 2008) and the actions taken following the earthquake in Abruzzo 
in April 2009 in Italy are also excluded, by referring to the stated intention of the governments.
20. The reasons for focusing on the measures taken since November 2008 are the following.
First, the fi scal packages introduced before were publicly motivated by reasons different from the 
economic crisis (e.g., consolidation for Italy). Second, these actions were decided when GDP growth 
projections for both countries were still positive.
21. The estimated effects of the discretionary measures refl ect a number of positive and nega-
tive adjustments to the original offi cial estimates of the fi scal packages. For Italy, for 2009 and 
2010 these adjustments broadly balance out. With regard to 2009, on the one hand, the revenue 
from the voluntary substitute tax on asset revaluations was higher than originally expected (0.4 per 
cent of GDP, instead of less than 0.2 per cent), likewise the proceeds of the “tax shield” exceeded 
the resources shifted to 2010 by 0.07 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, a number of fi nancing 
instruments seem likely to have been less effective than originally expected. For Germany, the ad-
ditional public investment included in the stimulus programmes is assumed to be implemented with 
substantial delay compared to the initial government plans.
22. Our assessment is not signifi cantly different from that presented in European Commission
(2009), p. 14. The fi gures provided there do not include more recent measures.
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2009 had been passed in December 2008, the Italian government had little lee-
way (until the mid-year budget revision) to introduce expansionary measures 
in response to the deteriorating growth outlook. In contrast, in Germany two 
supplementary defi cit-increasing budgets were adopted in the course of 2009 
at the central level; similar actions were taken at the regional level.
Table 1
Fiscal Policy In Italy and Germany in 2009
(change in ratio to GDP in percentage points with respect to 2008)
(defi cit-increasing: +)
Italy Germany
All Measures (percent of GDP) –0.3 +1.3
Stimulus Measures (percent of GDP) +0.3 +1.1
Automatic Stabilizers +1.4 +1.6
Other Changes in Primary Balance +1.4 +0.5
Overall Change in Primary Balance +3.1 +3.2
By focusing exclusively on discretionary fi scal measures, however, 
the assessment of the stabilising role of fi scal policy may well be signifi -
cantly distorted, particularly in the context of cross-country comparisons.23
Firstly, macroeconomic fl uctuations are dampened by automatic 
stabilizers. With regard to Italy and Germany in 2009, however, including 
the impact of the latter (estimated on the basis of the method presented in 
Bouthevillain et al., 2001) does not fundamentally change the relative rank-
ing of the two countries, as they are of almost equal size in both (Table 1).
Secondly, focusing exclusively on discretionary measures leads to 
neglecting the fact that differences in the existing legislations may imply 
divergent trajectories for the budget balance, even if the macroeconomic en-
vironment is the same for both countries. Therefore, for example, restrictive 
discretionary measures in one country may simply compensate for a larger 
– in relative terms – trend growth of expenditure under existing legislation.
One way to deal with this shortfall is to look at changes in the cyclical-
ly-adjusted primary balance (CAPB, i.e., the budget balance net of cyclical 
effects), as this takes simultaneously into account the effects of discretionary 
23. See De Castro, Kremer and Warmedinger (2010).
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measures and of other structural changes. This indicator, commonly used to 
assess the fi scal stance of one country, also shows an almost equal loosening 
in the two countries (a worsening of 1.6 per cent and 1.7 per cent respec-
tively in Germany and in Italy).
This fi nding – which suggests that caution should be exercised when 
comparing the fi scal policies of the two countries – appears to be attribut-
able, to a large extent, to the relatively strong growth in pension expenditure 
and larger revenue shortfalls in Italy. It may also be related to the fact that 
the two governments not only had good reasons to react differently to the 
crisis, but also that they could reap some short-term benefi ts by simply pre-
tending to do so. The Italian government had an incentive to tone down as 
much as possible any expansionary orientation of the budget in order to limit 
adverse fi nancial market reactions. In fact, the spreads on ten-year Italian 
government bonds vis-à-vis German bunds increased to around 150 basis 
points in early 2009, before gradually falling below 100 points already in 
the Summer (Figure 6). On the other hand, EU countries with worse fi scal 
starting positions were putting pressure on Germany to act, thus providing 
the German government with a political incentive to put as much emphasis 
as possible on the expansionary measures that it issued.
Concerning the composition of the discretionary measures (Figure 7), 
there are important differences between the two countries. First, while 
German measures are essentially all defi cit-increasing, those adopted in 
Italy include also defi cit-reducing interventions. The fi nancing side of the 
Italian stimulus measures is essentially based on two capital taxes, both due 
on a voluntary basis:24 a substitute tax on asset revaluations and (for the part 
of its receipts which was not shifted to 2010) a tax on assets held abroad ille-
gally. While the recourse to these taxes, compared to more standard revenue 
increases, has limited the negative impact on the consumption and invest-
ment decisions of private agents, enhancing the overall stimulus of the fi s-
cal package (see Section 4, below), it will have large costs in 2010 and the 
following years. The substitute tax on asset revaluations will cumulatively 
reduce revenue in the decade 2010-19 by 0.9 per cent of 2009 GDP, approxi-
mately twice as much as the receipts obtained last year. Second, the role of 
tax reliefs is much more important in the German stimulus packages than in 
those of Italy. As regards expenditure, the measures taken by Germany are 
only slightly larger (0.7 per cent of GDP versus 0.44 for Italy).
24. There were also numerous reductions in expenditure or increases in revenue, with a gener-
ally negligible impact.
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Figure 7
Stimulus Measures in 2009
(percent of GDP)
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Figure 8
Automatic Stabilizers in 2009
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While the size of the automatic stabilizers is comparable in the two 
countries, the channels through which they operate are somewhat different. 
In particular, the automatic increase in unemployment-related transfers were 
much larger in Germany (refl ecting its more generous and comprehensive 
social safety net), while the fall in social security contributions was greater 
in Italy, refl ecting the stronger impact of the crisis on the labour market.
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Going forward, the preliminary picture for 2010 seems more clear 
cut. While the European Commission in its autumn forecast expects the 
Italian (primary) defi cit ratio to improve marginally, for Germany it is pro-
jected to rise by ¾ percentage points, refl ecting further sizeable stimulus 
measures which are only to a limited extend offset by a positive impact from 
the cycle.25 The defi cit reduction projected for the coming years on a no 
policy change assumption is somewhat stronger for Germany than for Italy. 
While Germany is projected to reduce its defi cit ratio by close to 2 percent-
age points a 1½ percentage point reduction is foreseen for Italy. This implies 
that Italy needs to take additional consolidation measures to comply with 
the Council recommendation to correct its excessive defi cit by 2012 while, 
without further measures, Germany would reduce its defi cit ratio below the 
3 per cent threshold by 2011, two years ahead of the 2013 deadline.
IV. DISCRETIONARY MEASURES, AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS, NEUTRAL
BUDGET BENCHMARK, AND THEIR IMPACT ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
To appraise the impact of the budget on economic activity in Germany 
and Italy for 2009 we use the respective central bank’s econometric model 
(BbkM for Germany and BIQM for Italy)26 and compare historical develop-
ments against three counterfactual exercises:27,28
25. According to the Commission forecast, the positive impact of the cycle on the budget bal-
ance/GDP ratio for Germany in 2010 amounts to more than one percentage point. According to the 
ESCB approach to cyclical adjustment which takes into account the composition of growth (which 
is unfavourable for public fi nances in 2010) it is much smaller.
26. For a short presentation of the models used and references to more detailed descriptions, see 
Appendix 1. For the design of the simulations, see Section 3.
27. Of course, all analyses aiming at appraising the effects of a change in policy are subject to the
well-known logical fl aw which affects all evaluation of policy measures conducted on the basis of relation-
ships found to hold under a different policy set-up (Lucas, 1976). There are, however, several reasons to 
believe that in practice the Lucas Critique may be less disruptive than one could think: (i) the behaviour 
of economic agents may be backward-looking rather than forward-looking; this may be tested empirically 
(Hendry, 1988; Favero and Hendry, 1992); (ii) even if the agents’ expectation formation process is assumed 
to be forward-looking, the possibility exists that, because of the indeterminacy of the equilibrium, one may 
still specify rational and “Lucas-proof” decisional rules (Farmer, 1991); (iii) the institutional changes or 
policy measures in question may not be the “regime shifts” necessary for the Lucas Critique to apply (Sims, 
1982); this remark arguably applies to the case at hand; (iv) even if each individual agent were to modify her/
his decisional rule as a consequence of a policy regime shift, the aggregation of heterogeneous reactions may 
result in an aggregate response that is much less pronounced than each of the underlying individual reac-
tions, so that the actual, aggregate macroeconomic effects of a policy change may be better approximated by 
an approach that disregards the inherent non-structurality (Altissimo, Siviero and Terlizzese, 2002).
28. As is normally the case, all residuals and add-factors underlying the baseline simulation
(“history”) were used in all counterfactual simulations as well. A description of the ceteris paribus 
assumptions underlying all simulations is given in Appendix 3.
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1) a simulation in which discretionary fi scal stimulus measures are re-
moved; compared to history, this simulation provides an estimate of
the impact of discretionary interventions in response to the crisis;
2) a simulation in which, in addition to fi scal stimulus measures, cy-
clical effects are removed too; comparing this simulation with the
previous one we get an estimate of the impact of the automatic
stabilizers; moreover, it allows us to appraise the effectiveness
and, in a way, the short-term cost-effi ciency of the policies which
were actively pursued, against those associated with the automatic
stabilizers.
3) fi nally, a simulation in which all items of the general government
budget (excluding interest payments) remain at the same level as in
2008, in relation to trend GDP. Further details on the design of this
simulation are reported in Appendix 2. The results of this simulation
provide a “neutral” benchmark providing an indication of what might
have happened in an economy with a fully sterilized public sector.
All possible care was exercised to guarantee that the simulation de-
sign was exactly the same for both countries. However, the possibility can-
not be ruled out that the differences between the two national models refl ect 
not only genuine differences in the respective country’s characteristics – re-
fl ected in the models’ different parameter values – but also, at least in part, 
different modeling strategies underlying the construction of those models, 
despite the broad similarities in their general features (see Appendix 1).
Also, while the fi scal multipliers appear to be much higher in the 
model for Germany (consistent with previous literature),29 there are reasons 
to believe that, in the case of the specifi c episode we explore, the actual 
multipliers associated to changes in the public budget may have been dif-
ferent than in the (average) historical experience. On the one hand, in this 
exceptionally severe recession, increases in disposable income due to fi scal 
measures might have resulted in larger-than-usual increases in precautionary 
savings. Moreover, a more Ricardian reaction than in the past could be in-
duced by higher (expected) debt ratios and fi scal risks from fi nancial sector 
support (IMF, 2009) and by wealth losses suffered during the crisis. On the 
other hand, a less pronounced deterioration in public fi nances would have 
arguably implied lower interest risk premia (most plausibly in the case of 
Italy), and therefore higher multipliers, than estimated in our simulations, in 
29. The average multiplier for Italy (i.e., the weighted average of the multipliers associated to
the different budget items) is less than one third, whereas in Germany it exceeds two thirds.
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which interest rate have been kept unchanged (see Appendix 3 for the treat-
ment of interest rates in counterfactual simulations).
Finally, while we do not appraise the cross-country effects of public 
sector developments, they are likely to have been non-negligible, given the 
close trade ties between the two countries.
IV.1 The results
The estimated effects of the fi scal stimuli are reported in Table 2.
Discretionary stimulus measures have resulted in an increase in the 
defi cit to GDP ratio of 0.8 percentage points in Germany, but of only 0.2 
point in Italy. This result includes the cost of discretionary measures (see 
the discussion in Section 3) as well as the retroaction on the budget of 
their effects on the economy. In terms of impact on economic activity, 
the gap between the two countries narrows signifi cantly: the boost which 
German GDP received from fi scal stimulus measures30 in 2009 is estimated 
to amount to 0.8 percentage points; in Italy it is three quarters that fi gure 
(0.6 points). This result refl ects the large recourse to extraordinary taxes 
in Italy to fi nance the stimulus measures. In the BIQM, capital taxation 
(where these extraordinary taxes are classifi ed) does not directly infl uence 
disposable income and has negligible effects on economic activity. It may 
be argued that this feature of the model is particularly justifi ed in this case, 
given that the voluntary character of the payments made by the private 
agents should have strongly limited the negative impact of the tax on their 
consumption and investment decisions. As mentioned in Section 3, the 
more effective fi scal stimulus in Italy will have signifi cant budgetary costs 
in 2010 and in the following years. Excluding capital taxes from net bor-
rowing, the relative effectiveness of fi scal policies of the two countries 
(in terms of GDP gain for a given increase in defi cit) reverses, becoming 
slightly larger for Germany, refl ecting the already mentioned higher fi scal 
multipliers in the German model.31
30. Table 3 reports the effects of all discretionary fi scal measures along with those stemming
only for strictly crisis-related measures for Germany; it further presents the sole impact of the car-
scrapping scheme.
31. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Henry, Hernández de Cos and Momigliano 
(2008), where, for the fi rst year after the shock, the fi scal multiplier systematically tends to be 
higher for Germany than for Italy. This is not so, however, for the following year. See also Fagan 
and Morgan (2005).
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Table 2
Impact of Public Finances on the German and Italian
Macroeconomies, 2009
20
08
20
09
GDP 0,7 –4,7 0,8 2,1 2,1
Private consumption 0,6 –0,1 1,6 4,2 3,5
Total fixed investment 1,8 –10,1 1,7 2,6 2,1
Exports 2,0 –14,2 –0,1 –0,5 –0,3
Imports 2,9 –9,4 1,1 2,0 1,6
GDP deflator 1,0 1,4 -0,1 -0,4 –0,6
Public expenditures net of interest payments 2,7 5,7 1,2 1,9 2,3
Public receipts net of interest receipts 2,1 –2,0 –0,6 –2,8 –4,3
Public deficit / GDP (*) 0,1 –3,0 0,8 2,1 3,3
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / GDP (*) 2,5 –0,7 0,8 2,1 3,2
Public expenditures net of interest payments / GDP (*) 41,1 44,9 0,2 0,1 0,4
Public receipts net of interest receipts / GDP (*) 43,5 44,2 –0,6 –2,0 –2,8
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / Trend GDP (*) 2,5 –0,7 0,8 2,0 3,1
GDP –1,3 –5,0 0,6 1,0 1,0
Private consumption –0,4 –1,2 0,5 1,1 1,0
Total fixed investment –4,0 –12,1 1,3 1,4 0,7
Exports –3,9 –19,1 0,0 0,3 0,4
Imports –4,3 –14,5 0,9 1,4 1,2
GDP deflator 2,8 2,1 0,0 –0,6 –1,6
Public expenditures net of interest payments 3,4 4,9 1,5 1,6 2,7
Public receipts net of interest receipts 1,1 –1,9 1,0 –1,5 –4,5
Public deficit / GDP (*) 2,7 5,3 0,2 1,5 3,5
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / GDP (*) –2,7 0,4 0,2 1,5 3,4
Public expenditures net of interest payments / GDP (*) 44,2 47,8 0,4 0,6 1,6
Public receipts net of interest receipts / GDP (*) 46,4 46,7 0,2 –0,9 –1,8
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / Trend GDP (*) –2,2 1,1 0,2 1,4 3,3
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Table 3
Breakdown of the Effects of Discretionary Public Finance Measures 
on the German Macroeconomy, 2009
GDP 1,0 0,8 0,2
Private consumption 1,8 1,6 0,7
Total fixed investment 1,6 1,7 0,3
Exports –0,1 –0,1 0,0
Imports 1,2 1,1 0,7
GDP deflator 0,0 –0,1 0,0
1,9 1,2 0,3Public expenditures net of interest payments 
Public receipts net of interest receipts –0,6 –0,6 0,2
1,1 0,8 0,1
1,1 0,8 0,1
0,5 0,2 0,0
Public deficit / GDP (*) 
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / GDP (*) 
Public expenditures net of interest payments / GDP (*) 
Public receipts net of interest receipts / GDP (*) 
–0,7 –0,6 0,0
Public deficit net of interest payments and receipts / Trend GDP (*) 1,1 0,8 0,1
All Measures     
(cfr. Table 4)
Of which :
Taken
in Response
to the Crisis
Of which :     
Reflecting 
Environmental 
Premium
Note: Deviations from base line in percent, except (*): percentage points.
The estimated impact of fi scal measures on GDP includes the effects 
of car scrapping schemes (in both countries) and incentives to investment 
on machinery (in Italy only). Car scrapping schemes were introduced in 
February 2009 in both countries and expired in September and December, 
respectively. It is estimated that their contribution to GDP growth in 2009 
amounted to 0.2 percentage points in both countries. Investment incentives 
in Italy (the so-called “Tremonti-ter”) were introduced in July 2009 and are 
due to expire next June. We estimate that in 2009 they boosted GDP by 
slightly more than 0.1 percentage points.
Preliminary estimates for 2010 (based on projections for both public 
fi nance aggregates and macroeconomic variables) suggest that the gap be-
tween the two countries in terms of support to growth from fi scal stimulus 
measures will widen this year: the Italian fi scal impact on economic activity 
will turn broadly neutral while for Germany it will be broadly the same as 
in 2009. In both countries, a negative impact on GDP growth is estimated to 
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stem from the expiration of the car scrapping incentives. In Italy, this will 
be broadly offset by higher current expenditure (fi nanced, as in 2009, by 
extraordinary taxation) and by some (positive) lagged effects of the 2009 
measures. In the case of Germany, signifi cant expenditure-increasing and 
revenue-reducing measures have been implemented for 2010.
While the automatic stabilizers had a broadly comparable impact on 
the budget balance (1.4 per cent of output for Italy and 1.6 per cent for 
Germany), their estimated effects on GDP are much more pronounced in 
Germany than in Italy (1.3 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively). This 
refl ects partly their composition (with much higher unemployment-related 
payments in the case of Germany) and, to a larger extent, the higher fi scal 
multipliers in the German model. In both countries, however, automatic sta-
bilizers have been relatively less effective than discretionary measures, in 
terms of GDP gain for a given increase in current defi cit.
Overall, discretionary and automatic fi scal responses to the downturn 
are assessed to have contributed to reducing the impact of the crisis in 2009 
by 1.0 percentage points in Italy and by 2.1 in Germany.32 The difference 
between the two countries virtually vanishes if the extreme assumption is 
made that the two economies react identically to fi scal shocks and hence the 
same set of standard fi scal multipliers is used for both countries.33
The impact on prices of the fi scal responses to the crisis (automat-
ic and discretionary together) has been more pronounced in Italy than in 
Germany, refl ecting the larger fall (due to automatic stabilizers) in social 
contribution and VAT in the former country (see Section 3).
The deviations which occurred in 2009 of budgetary components 
from the neutrality assumption (as defi ned above) led to a 3 percentage 
points increase of the defi cit-to-GDP ratio in both countries (last column of 
Table 2). In Italy, the difference can be evenly attributed to both receipts and 
32. It must be noted that our estimates do not include the impact of some measures taken by both 
governments whose effects cannot be easily assessed (e.g., measures taken to foster banks’ capitali-
zation, to extend guarantees on deposits, etc.). To put our estimates into perspective, it may be useful 
to refer, for the Italian case only, to the results in Caivano, Rodano and Siviero (2010). They estimate 
the effects on output of the reaction of monetary policy to the crisis to be approximately the same as 
the positive boost of fi scal policy as estimated here. Their estimate, however, does not include the 
impact of non-conventional monetary policies.
33. We used the set of multipliers of the OECD Interlink model for the euro area presented in
Dalsgaard et al. (2001): 1.2 for direct spending and –0.5 for taxes. We applied the multiplier for 
taxes also to transfers. In this analysis, for both countries, the general government reduced the fall in 
real GDP in 2009 by approximately 1½ percentage points.
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expenditures, in Germany, mostly to receipts. The corresponding effects on 
GDP are, for both countries, close to the overall estimated impact of discre-
tionary measures and automatic stabilizers (previous column of Table 2), 
notwithstanding the much larger change induced on the defi cit.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The worldwide recession that spread in the fall of 2008 was counter-
acted by an extraordinarily massive and prompt response of both monetary 
and fi scal policy authorities everywhere.
In the European context, the recourse to discretionary fi scal stimulus 
measures and the intensity with which automatic stabilisers operated varied 
across countries, largely refl ecting the different room for manoeuvre set by 
their different starting conditions.
Germany and Italy, the countries object of this study, responded to the 
crisis with a relatively ample fi scal reaction by the fi rst and with a limited 
stimulus by the latter.
Concerning discretionary and automatic budgetary responses, our 
fi ndings – which overall suggest that differences may be less pronounced 
than they look – may be summarised as follows:
1) The discretionary stimulus measures in Germany have been mark-
edly more defi cit-expanding than in Italy. However, the cyclically-
adjusted primary balances worsened by a similar amount in the two
countries; in other terms, the difference in discretionary policies
largely offset the divergence in underlying trends (which implied a
larger worsening of the budget balance in Italy);
2) contrary to Germany, Italy fi nanced its stimulus measures partly
with defi cit-reducing interventions characterized by a limited nega-
tive impact on the economic activity, with the aim of stimulating the
economy while at the same time limiting the short-term effects on
the defi cit; this policy implies, however, future budgetary costs.
3) the automatic stabilisers are estimated to have had a comparable
impact on the defi cit of the two countries.
We also assessed the macroeconomic effects of stimulus measures 
and the overall stabilizing role of the two public sectors on the basis of 
counterfactual simulations with the econometric models of the two countries 
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developed and maintained at the Deutsche Bundesbank and Banca d’Italia, 
respectively. Our main results are the following:
i) discretionary stimulus measures raised GDP by 0.8 percentage points
in Germany and 0.6 points in Italy. For a given impact on the defi cit,
the effect on Italian GDP is larger, refl ecting the differences in the
composition of the two stimulus packages (which more than offset the
lower fi scal multipliers implicit in Banca d’Italia’s model);
ii) by contrast, automatic stabilisers are estimated to have boosted out-
put more in Germany than in Italy;
iii) overall, the general government reduced the fall in real GDP in 2009
by more than 2 percentage points in Germany and by 1 in Italy.
As already noted, the results of our simulations are infl uenced by dif-
ferences in the two econometric models, which (though consistent with pre-
vious fi ndings in the literature) may or may not fully correspond to genuine 
differences between the two economies. Under the extreme assumption that 
the two economies react identically to fi scal shocks, the differences in the 
combined impact of discretionary fi scal measures and automatic stabilizers 
in 2009 almost vanish.
APPENDIX 1: 
THE MODELS USED FOR THE COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS
Bundesbank’s BbkM: The long-run properties of the quarterly mac-
roeconometric model of the Bundesbank can be described as neoclassical; 
in the short-run, by contrast, the model features are basically Keynesian. 
Potential GDP is derived by a Cobb-Douglas production technology with 
constant returns to scale and long-run growth is driven by variations in pop-
ulation and productivity. Firms and households optimise their behaviour. 
Their expectation formation process is largely backward-looking (adaptive 
expectations). The short-run properties of the model are determined by price 
and wage rigidities. The rather slow adjustment of prices and wages to their 
equilibrium levels leads to persistent market disequilibria and cyclical fl uc-
tuations around the path of potential GDP.34
34. A more comprehensive description of the model can be found in Hamburg and Tödter
(2005). Since 2005 the model has been used in a version adjusted to requirements of the projec-
tion process within the ESCB. Calculations are undertaken with the model focusing on the German 
economy, where “external” variables (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates, international commodity 
prices) are exogenous.
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Banca d’Italia’s BIQM: The new version of the BIQM shares many 
of the characteristics of the previous one, released in 1986 (see Banca 
d’Italia, 1986). Its long-term properties are consistent with a neoclassical 
model postulating exogenous growth, in which full employment of factors 
is accompanied by a constant rate of infl ation, hence constant relative prices. 
The levels of output and of the employment of capital and labour are con-
sistent with the parameters of the aggregate production function and with 
relative factor costs. The steady-state growth path of the model, stemming 
from technical progress and the accumulation of real and fi nancial wealth, 
interacts with the dynamics of the adjustment process to determine short-
term characteristics.35 The adjustment processes essentially refl ect three fac-
tors: the stickiness of prices and wages, which prevents their instantaneous 
adaptation to the situation of full resource utilisation; the non-malleability 
of installed physical capital, which limits the short-term modifi ability of the 
relative composition of productive factors; and the possibility that expecta-
tions and outcomes may not coincide. In the short run, therefore, given these 
rigidities, the characteristics of the model fi t the Keynesian framework in 
which the level of output is determined by the trend in aggregate demand, in 
a situation of oversupply in both the goods and the labour market.36
APPENDIX 2: 
THE DESIGN OF THE NEUTRAL BENCHMARK COUNTERFACTUAL 
SIMULATION
To simulate the effects of neutral public budget, we adopt the follow-
ing defi nition: the activity of the public sector is deemed neutral if all the 
items of the general government budget in 2009 (excluding interest pay-
ments) remain at the same level of 2008, in relation to trend GDP.37
This defi nition of neutrality includes a small but relevant variant with 
respect to the defi nition adopted in previous studies. Specifi cally, instead of 
keeping budget items unchanged with respect to GDP, in this case we chose 
35. The coexistence of a neoclassical macroeconomic equilibrium framework with Keynesian
short-to-medium-term adjustment processes is a feature shared by most existing macroeconometric 
models (see, e.g., Church, Sault, Sgherri and Wallis, 2000).
36. For a more detailed description of the main properties of the model, see Busetti, Locarno
and Monteforte (2005).
37. For a more detailed discussion of the motivations behind this choice, including a critical
appraisal of the drawbacks that alternative defi nitions (e.g., keeping budget items unchanged in real 
terms) entail, see, e.g., Momigliano and Siviero (1997), where references to the relevant literature 
may also be found.
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to keep them constant with respect to trend GDP. This choice is justifi ed by 
the large output drop recorded in 2009 in both countries. Had we kept the 
ratios unchanged with respect to (headline) GDP, this would have implied 
slashing all budget items by a very sizeable, and implausible, amount (about 
4 per cent in nominal terms). Such a dramatic cut to all budget items could 
hardly be deemed “neutral”. Keeping items unchanged with respect to trend 
GDP guarantees medium-term neutrality, avoiding excessive fl uctuations in 
budgetary items.
A different criterion was adopted for interest payments, kept endoge-
nous as a function of interest rates and the size of public debt.38 Consequently, 
the counterfactual simulation refl ects, via the channel of interest payments, 
the indirect effects stemming from the counterfactual developments in all 
other budget items.
It should be emphasized that the “neutral budget” simulation cannot 
be directly compared with the other two (i.e., with the “no discretionary 
measures” and “no cyclical effects” simulations), as it ignores by construc-
tion any additional information on the effectiveness of specifi c fi scal policy 
measures. For instance, the macroeconomic effects of incentives for car pur-
chases (estimated to have boosted the GDP of both countries by 0.2 points 
in 2009) are included in the previous two simulations, but not in the “neutral 
budget” one.
APPENDIX 3: 
TREATMENT OF CETERIS PARIBUS ASSUMPTIONS
This appendix describes the assumptions which were formulated for 
exchange rates, interest rates and the mechanisms involved in the formation 
of expectations in all counterfactual simulations.
As regards interest rates, the choice was made to keep the nominal 
short-term interest rates unchanged with respect to history. Let us remark, in 
this respect, that our counterfactual simulations, while resulting in a further 
worsening of the economic activity, do not radically change the picture: the 
order of magnitude of the recession, though sensibly reduced, remains very 
large in a historical perspective. It is thus reasonable to assume that mon-
etary policy would not have been much different for our fi scal policy simula-
tions. Let us also emphasize that margins for further expansionary monetary 
38. For the treatment of interest rates in the counterfactual benchmark simulation, see Subsection 3.4.
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policy with traditional tools were limited, given the low levels reached by 
policy interest rates.39 Long-term rates were also kept unchanged.
As regards the (nominal) exchange rate, the technically simple hy-
pothesis of unchanged historical values was adopted; this choice is justifi ed 
by the same line of reasoning as above.
Instead of the foregoing hypotheses it would have been possible, in 
theory, to try and take account of the effects of the public fi nances on the 
risk premia associated with the issuer and expectations concerning infl ation 
and the exchange rate. Overall, we feel that our choices minimize the margin 
of discretion and are less arbitrary than alternatives, given the well-known 
diffi culties of fi nding sensible and empirically robust explanations of risk 
premia dynamics.
As regards the treatment of economic agents’ expectations, the lat-
ter are by and large assumed to be of the adaptive type in both models, with 
the exception of infl ation expectations in the BIQM, which are generated 
by an equation modeling expectations data taken from the Isco-Mondo 
Economico survey.
It should be noted, however, that some phenomena that may have 
played an important role in determining the macroeconomic effects of fi scal 
policy in the case at hand cannot be taken into account. This is the case, for 
instance, of the public guarantees which were announced, at the peak of the 
fi nancial crisis, to reassure economic agents (in particular depositors) and 
hence avoid a meltdown of the fi nancial system.
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